


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18cr820 (JSK) USA v SAYOC
FBI Laboratory

2501 Investigation Parkway
Quantico, Virginia 22135

4940 Fowler Road
Huntsville, Alabama 35898

LABORATORY REPORT

To: Joseph John Capaccio
New York

Date: January 2, 2019

Case ID No.: NY-3005093

Lab No.: 2018-03241-8

Communication(s): October 30, 2018

Agency Reference(s):


Subject(s):

Victim(s):

Discipline(s): Explosives Device

FBI Laboratory Evidence Designator(s):

- Item 1 Envelope addressed to "Maxim Waters" (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-1 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-2 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-3 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-4 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-5 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-6 Stamp removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-7 Tape removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-7-1 Label bearing printing beginning "TO: MAXIM WATERS..." removed from Item 1-7. (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-7-2 Label bearing printing "WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515" removed from Item 1-7 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-8 Label removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-9 Label removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-10 Label removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-11 Tape removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
- Item 1-11-1 Tape removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)



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Item 1-11-2	Tape removed from Item 1 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer with battery (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2-1	Tape removed from Item 2 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2-2	Tape removed from Item 2 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2-3	Piece of paper from Item 2 - ISIS Flag (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2-3-1	Image of Maxine Waters (1B23-E6259371)
Item 2-4	Hook and loop tape from Item 2 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3	Powder removed from Item 2 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-1	Powder sample from Item 3 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-2	Clear fragments from Item 3 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-3	Unknown mineral-like material from Item 3 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-4	Clear sphere from Item 3 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5	Debris recovered from Item 3 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-1	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-2	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-3	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-4	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-5	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-6	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-7	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-8	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-9	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 3-5-10	Glass recovered from Item 3-5 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4	Envelope (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-1	Powder removed from Item 4 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-1-1	Powder sample from Item 4-1 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-1-2	Powder sample from Item 4-1 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-1-3	Debris from Item 4-1 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-2	Hair removed from Item 4 (1B23-E6259371)

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Item 4-2-1	Root portion of Item 4-2 hair (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-3	Portion of paper from Item 4 (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-4	Hair removed from Item 4 flap (1B23-E6259371)
Item 4-4-1	Root portion of Item 4-4 hair (1B23-E6259371)
Item 5	Envelope addressed to "Barrack Obama" (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-1	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-2	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-3	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-4	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-5	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-6	Stamp removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-7	Label removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-8	Label removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 5-9	Tape removed from Item 5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer with battery (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6-1	Tape removed from Item 6 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6-2	Tape removed from Item 6 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6-3	Piece of paper from Item 6 - ISIS Flag (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6-3-1	Image of Obama Family (1B20-E5520897)
Item 6-4	Debris (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7	Powder removed from Item 6 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-1	Powder sample from Item 7 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-2	Clear fragments from Item 7 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-3	Clear spheres removed from Item 7 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-4	Unknown mineral-like material from Item 7 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5	Debris recovered from Item 7 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-1	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-2	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-3	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)

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Item 7-5-4	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-5	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-6	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-7	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-8	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-9	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 7-5-10	Glass recovered from Item 7-5 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8	Envelope (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8-1	Powder removed from Item 8 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8-1-1	Powder sample from Item 8-1 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8-1-2	Powder sample from Item 8-1 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8-1-3	Debris from Item 8-1 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 8-2	Label removed from Item 8 (1B20-E5520897)
Item 9	Trace - Hairs/Fibers Secondary Evidence (slides) (1B23-E6259371)
Item 10	Soil sample (1B4-E6261702)
Item 11	Soil sample (1B3-E6261701)
Item 12	Soil sample (1B5-E6261703)
Item 13	Pieces of envelope formerly addressed to "George Soros" (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-1	Powder sample from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-2	Stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-3	Stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-4	Portion of stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-5	Portion of stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-6	Portion of stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-7	Portion of stamp removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-8	Tape removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-9	Label removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-10	Label removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-11	Tape removed from Item 13 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-12	Piece of plastic (1B9-E6261718)

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Item 13-12-1	Tape removed from Item 13-12 (1B9-E6261718)
Item 13-13	Portion of smaller envelope removed from Item 13 container (1B9-E6261718)
Item 14	Soil sample (1B8-E6261720)
Item 15	PVC end cap, wire, and plastic (1B11-E6261708)
Item 15-1	Tape with Item 15 (1B11-E6261708)
Item 16	PVC pipe, and wire (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-1	Powder sample from Item 16 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-1-1	Clear fragments from 16-1 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-2	Tape removed from Item 16 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-2-1	Photo from Item 16-2 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-2-1-1	Tape removed from Item 16-2-1 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-3	Label from Item 16 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-3-1	Tape removed from Item 16-3 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 16-4	Piece of black electrical tape with Item 16 (1B10-E6261707)
Item 17	Powder sample (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1	Clear fragments from Item 17 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-1	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-2	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-3	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-4	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-5	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-6	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-7	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-8	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-9	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-10	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-11	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-1-12	Glass recovered from Item 17-1 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-2	Clear sphere from Item 17 (1B2-E6261700)
Item 17-3	Unknown mineral-like material from Item 17 (1B2-E6261700)

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Item 18	Soil, plant, and fragmentary debris (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-1	Pieces of paper with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-2	White plastic debris with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-3	Clock component debris with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-4	Plastic debris with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-5	Miscellaneous debris with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-6	Tape with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-7	Piece of colored paper with Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-7-1	Tape removed from Item 18-7 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 18-8	Root of hair from Item 18 (1B7-E6261705)
Item 19	Render safe rounds (1B1-E6261699)
Item 20	Debris (1B18-E6261715)
Item 20-1	Glass recovered from Item 20 (1B18-E6261715)
Item 20-2	Glass recovered from Item 20 (1B18-E6261715)
Item 20-3	Glass recovered from Item 20 (1B18-E6261715)
Item 20-4	Glass recovered from Item 20 (1B18-E6261715)
Item 20-5	Glass recovered from Item 20 (1B18-E6261715)
Item 21	Battery (1B17-E6261714)
Item 22	Paper debris (1B16-E6261713)
Item 22-1	Portions of postage stamp(s) (1B16-E6261713)
Item 23	Pieces of paper and plastic with tape (1B15-E6261712)
Item 24	Circuit board pieces (1B14-E6261711)
Item 24-1	Pieces of circuit board and debris (1B14-E6261711)
Item 25	Wadding from PAN round (1B12-E6261709)
Item 26	PVC fragments and debris (1B19-E6261716)
Item 26-1	Tape from Item 26 (1B19-E6261716)
Item 27	Plastic pieces, hook and loop tape, debris (1B13-E6261710)
Item 27-1	Debris from Item 27 (1B13-E6261710)
Item 28	Tarp (1B6-E6261704)
Item 29	Envelope

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Item 29-1	Piece of paper beginning "Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr." from Item 29
Item 29-2	Piece of paper beginning "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ..." from Item 29
Item 29-3	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-4	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-5	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-6	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-7	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-8	Stamp from Item 29
Item 29-9	Tape from Item 29
Item 30	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer with battery
Item 30-1	Tape removed from Item 30
Item 30-1-1	Plastic removed from Item 30-1
Item 30-2	Photo removed from Item 30
Item 30-3	Label removed from Item 30
Item 30-4	Photo removed from Item 30
Item 30-5	Tape removed from Item 30
Item 30-6	Tape removed from Item 30
Item 30-7	Part of timer from Item 30
Item 31	Powder removed from Item 30
Item 31-1	Powder sample from Item 31
Item 31-2	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-3	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-4	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-5	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-6	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-7	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-8	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-9	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 31-10	Glass recovered from Item 31

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Item 31-11	Glass recovered from Item 31
Item 32	Envelope
Item 32-1	Powder removed from Item 32
Item 32-1-1	Powder sample from Item 32-1
Item 33	Envelope
Item 33-1	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-2	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-3	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-4	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-5	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-6	Stamp removed from Item 33
Item 33-7	Label removed from Item 33
Item 33-8	Label removed from Item 33
Item 33-9	Tape removed from Item 33
Item 33-9-1	One piece of tape removed from Item 33-9
Item 33-10	Label with tape removed from Item 33
Item 34	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer
Item 34-1	Tape removed from Item 34
Item 34-2	Photo removed from Item 34
Item 34-3	Label removed from Item 34
Item 34-4	Photo removed from Item 34
Item 34-5	Tape removed from Item 34
Item 34-6	Tape removed from Item 34
Item 34-7	Paper removed from Item 34
Item 34-7-1	Plastic removed from Item 34
Item 34-7-2	Tape removed from Item 34-7
Item 35	Powder removed from Item 34
Item 35-1	Powder sample from Item 35
Item 35-2	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-3	Glass recovered from Item 35

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Item 35-4	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-5	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-6	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-7	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-8	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-9	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-10	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 35-11	Glass recovered from Item 35
Item 36	Envelope and small portion of flap
Item 36-1	Powder removed from Item 36
Item 36-1-1	Powder sample from Item 36-1
Item 36-2	Label removed from Item 36
Item 37	One PVC pipe with two (2) end caps, wires, putty, spring, and digital timer (1B22-E6261698)
Item 37-1	Tape from Item 37 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 37-2	Tape from Item 37 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 37-2-1	Piece of paper from Item 37-2 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 37-2-2	Piece of paper from Item 37-2 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 37-3	Tape from Item 37 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38	Powder removed from Item 37 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-1	Powder sample from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-2	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-3	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-4	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-5	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-6	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-7	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-8	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-9	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)
Item 38-10	Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)

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Item 38-1I Glass recovered from Item 38 (1B22-E6261698)

Item 39 Envelope (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-1 Piece of paper bearing "TO: ROBERT DE NIRO..." from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-2 Piece of paper bearing "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ..." from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-3 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-4 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-5 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-6 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-7 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-8 Stamp from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 39-9 Tape from Item 39 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40 One (1) PVC pipe with two (2) end caps, wires, putty, spring, digital timer, and debris (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-1 Tape from Item 40 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-2 Tape from Item 40 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-2-1 Piece of paper from Item 40-2 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-2-2 Piece of paper from Item 40-2 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-3 Tape from Item 40 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 40-4 Piece of timer from Item 40

Item 41 Powder removed from Item 40 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-1 Powder sample from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-2 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-3 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-4 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-5 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-6 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-7 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-8 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

Item 41-9 Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)

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Item 41-10	Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)
Item 41-11	Glass recovered from Item 41 (1B28-E6261721)
Item 42	Envelope (1B28-E6261721)
Item 42-1	Powder removed from Item 42 (1B28-E6261721)
Item 42-1-1	Powder sample from Item 42-1 (1B28-E6261721)
Item 42-2	Label removed from Item 42 (1B28-E6261721)
Item 43	Envelope addressed to "Hilary Clinton" (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-1	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-2	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-3	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-4	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-5	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-6	Stamp from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-7	Left portion of paper from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-8	Right portion of paper on Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-9	Tape from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-10	Paper from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 43-11	Tape from Item 43 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 44	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer with battery (1B21-E6261697)
Item 44-1	Tape removed from Item 44 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 44-2	Photo removed from Item 44 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 44-3	Label removed from Item 44 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 44-4	Tape removed from Item 44 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45	Powder removed from Item 44 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-1	Powder sample from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-2	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-3	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-4	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-5	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)

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Item 45-6	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-7	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-8	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-9	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-10	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 45-11	Glass recovered from Item 45 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 46	Envelope (1B21-E6261697)
Item 46-1	Powder removed from Item 46 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 46-1-1	Powder sample from Item 46-1 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 46-2	Label removed from Item 46 (1B21-E6261697)
Item 47	One PVC pipe with end cap and wire (1B24-E6288497)
Item 47-1	Tape removed from Item 47 (1B24-E6288497)
Item 47-2	Tape removed from Item 47 (1B24-E6288497)
Item 47-3	Paper removed from Item 47 (1B24-E6288497)
Item 47-4	Paper removed from Item 47 (1B24-E6288497)
Item 48	Pieces of envelope formerly addressed to "Eric Himpton Ho..." with tape (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-1	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-2	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-3	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-4	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-5	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-6	Stamp removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-7	Return address label removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-8	Address label removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-9	Tape removed from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-10	Small envelope and label (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-10-1	Root of hair from Item 48-10 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-10-2	One (1) grommet recovered from inside Item 48-10 envelope (1B25-E6288489)
Item 48-11	Root of hair from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)

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Item 48-12	Root of hair from Item 48 (1B25-E6288489)
Item 49	PVC pieces, tape, debris (1B26-E652964)
Item 49-1	Tape removed from Item 49 (1B26-E652964)
Item 49-2	Tape removed from Item 49 (1B26-E652964)
Item 49-3	Velcro removed from Item 49 (1B26-E652964)
Item 49-4	Paper removed from Item 49 (1B26-E652964)
Item 50	Pieces of timer and tape (1B27-E652963)
Item 50-1	Hook and loop tape removed from Item 50 (1B27-E652963)
Item 50-2	Tape removed from Item 50 (1B27-E652963)
Item 50-3	Tape from Item 50 (1B27-E652963)
Item 51	Trace - Hairs/Fibers Secondary Evidence (1 pillbox) (1B23-E6259371)
Item 52	Powder sample from Item 47 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-1	Debris removed from Item 52 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-2	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-3	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-4	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-5	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-6	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-7	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 52-8	Glass recovered from Item 52-1 (1B55; E652959)
Item 53	Powder removed from Item 47 (1B56; E652958)
Item 54	Debris (1B57; E652957)
Item 55	Powder sample from Item 58 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-1	Debris from Item 55 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-2	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-3	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-4	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-5	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-6	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-7	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)

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Item 55-8	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-9	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-10	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 55-11	Glass recovered from Item 55-1 (1B41; E6288505)
Item 56	Envelope (1B42; E652962)
Item 56-1	Powder from Item 56 (1B42; E652962)
Item 56-1-1	Powder sample from Item 56-1 (1B42; E652962)
Item 56-1-2	Debris from Item 56-1 (1B42; E652962)
Item 57	Envelope and tape (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-1	Piece of paper beginning "TO: CORY BOOKER..." (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-2	Piece of paper beginning "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ [sic]..." (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-3	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-4	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-5	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-6	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-7	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-8	Stamp from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 57-9	Tape from Item 57 (1B43; E652961)
Item 58	Pipe with one end cap, wire, pieces of pipe, glass, plastic film, hook and loop tape, and digital timer (1B44; E652960)
Item 58-1	Tape from Item 58 (1B44; E652960)
Item 58-2	Paper from Item 58 (1B44; E652960)
Item 58-2-1	Photo from Item 58-2 (1B44; E652960)
Item 58-3	Tape from Item 58 (1B44; E652960)
Item 58-4	Pieces of PVC pipe, putty, and wire (1B44; E652960)
Item 59	PAN round cartridge (1B29-E5532633)
Item 60	Powder sample (1B31-E5532635)
Item 61	Powder sample (1B34-E5532638)
Item 62	One PVC pipe with with end cap, putty, timer, wires (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-1	Tape removed from Item 62 (1B37-E5532641)

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Item 62-2	Tape removed from Item 62 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-3	Hook and loop tape removed from Item 62 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-4	Color photo from Item 62 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-5	Paper with foreign text from Item 62 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-6	Debris (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-6-1	Glass recovered from Item 62-6 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-6-2	Glass recovered from Item 62-6 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-6-3	Glass recovered from Item 62-6 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 62-6-4	Glass recovered from Item 62-6 (1B37-E5532641)
Item 63	Envelope addressed to "Maxim Waters" (1B38-E5532642)
Item 63-1	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-2	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-3	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-4	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-5	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-6	Stamp removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-7	Label removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-8	Label removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 63-9	Tape removed from Item 63 (1B38, E5532641)
Item 64	Envelope and flap (1B33-E5532637)
Item 64-1	Debris (1B33-E5532637)
Item 64-1-1	Glass recovered from Item 64-1 (1B33-E5532637)
Item 64-1-2	Glass recovered from Item 64-1 (1B33-E5532637)
Item 64-2	Label from Item 64 (1B33, E5532637)
Item 65	Envelope addressed to "James Robert Clapper" (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-1	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-2	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-3	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-4	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-5	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)

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Item 65-6	Stamp from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-7	Address label from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-7-1	Tape from Item 65-7 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-8	Return address label from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 65-9	Tape from Item 65 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66	One PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-1	Black tape removed from Item 66 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-2	Clear tape removed from Item 66 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-2-1	Photo from Item 66-2 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-2-2	Piece of paper from Item 66-2 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-3	Piece of loose plastic lined paper with Item 66 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-4	Hook and loop tape removed from Item 66 (pipe) (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-5	Hook and loop tape removed from Item 66 (timer) (1B62-E6228497)
Item 66-6	Piece of loose plastic bearing a time (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67	Powder from Item 66 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-1	Powder sample from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-2	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-3	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-4	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-5	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-6	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-7	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-8	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-9	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-10	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 67-11	Glass recovered from Item 67 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 68	Envelope (1B62-E6228497)
Item 68-1	Powder removed from Item 68 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 68-1-1	Powder sample from 68-1 (1B62-E6228497)
Item 68-1-2	Debris from Item 68-1 (1B62-E6228497)

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Item 69 Envelope addressed to "Kamalia Harris" (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-1 Piece of paper beginning "TO: KAMALIA [sic] HARRIS..." (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-2 Piece of paper beginning "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ [sic]..." (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-3 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-4 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-5 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-6 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-7 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-8 Stamp from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 69-9 Tape from Item 69 (1B71, E624040)

Item 70 One PVC pipe with two end caps, putty, wire, digital timer (1B70-E624039)

Item 70-1 Tape removed from Item 70 (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-2 Tape removed from Item 70 (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-3 Hook and loop tape removed from Item 70 (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-4 Color photo removed from Item 70 (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-5 Paper with black and white foreign text removed from Item 70 (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-6 Glass fragment (1B70, E624039)

Item 70-7 Glass fragment (1B70, E624039)

Item 71 Debris (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-1 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-2 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-3 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-4 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-5 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-6 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-7 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-8 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

Item 71-9 Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)

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Item 71-10	Glass recovered from Item 71 (1B73-E624038)
Item 72	Envelope and piece of flap (1B71-E624040)
Item 72-1	Label removed from Item 72 (1B71, E624039)
Item 73	Unused "TNT Blazing Rebel Fireworks" pyrotechnic (1B91, E637272)
Item 73-1	Wrapper from Item 73 (1B91, E637272)
Item 73-2	Powder sample from Item 73 (1B91, E637272)
Item 73-3	Fuse from Item 73 (1B91, E637272)
Item 74	Unused "TNT Mr Crackle" pyrotechnic (1B92, E637273)
Item 74-1	Wrapper from Item 74 (1B92, E637273)
Item 74-2	Powder sample from Item 74 (1B92, E637273)
Item 74-3	Fuse from Item 74 (1B92, E637273)
Item 75	Two unopened packages of "Hyper Tough Solder" (1B93, E637276)
Item 75-1	One unopened package of "Hyper Tough Solder" (1B93, E637276)
Item 76	Wrapper for "TNT Super Value 3 Pack" pyrotechnics (1B94, E637275)
Item 77	Black and gray digital timer with hook and loop tape (1B95, E637274)
Item 78	Envelope (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-1	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-2	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-3	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-4	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-5	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-6	Stamp removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-7	Label removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-8	Label removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-9	Tape removed from Item 78 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 78-9-1	Hair from Item 78-9 (1B64-E5523920)
Item 79	One PVC pipe with end cap, plastic, putty, digital timer, wire (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-1	Tape removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-2	Tape removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-3	Tape removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)

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Item 79-4	Tape removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-5	Velcro removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-6	Paper removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-7	Paper removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-8	Tape removed from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-9	Debris from Item 79 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-10	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-11	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-12	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-13	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-14	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-15	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-16	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-17	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-18	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 79-19	Glass recovered from Item 79-9 (1B63-E5523919)
Item 80	Powder sample (1B66-E5523922)
Item 81	Envelope (1B65-E5523921)
Item 81-1	Powder removed from Item 81 (1B65-E5523921)
Item 81-1-1	Powder sample from Item 81-1 (1B65-E5523921)
Item 81-1-2	Debris from Item 81-1 (1B65-E5523921)
Item 81-2	Label removed from Item 81 (1B65-E5523921)
Item 82	Hair sample from Cesar Sayoc (1B199, E4862875)
Item 83	Buccal sample from Cesar Sayoc (1B198, E4862876)
Item 84	Powder sample (1B72-E624036)
Item 84-1	Debris from Item 84 (1B72-E624036)
Item 85	Powder sample (1B74-E624037)
Item 86	Envelope formerly addressed to "John Brennan" (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-1	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-2	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)

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Item 86-3	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-4	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-5	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-6	Stamp removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-7	Paper removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-8	Paper removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 86-9	Tape removed from Item 86 (1B58-E6228496)
Item 87	Envelope (1B58-E6228496)
Item 87-1	Label removed from Item 87 (1B59-E6228493)
Item 88	Powder sample (1B60-E6228494)
Item 88-1	Debris from Item 88 (1B60-E6228494)
Item 89	Envelope formerly addressed to "CNN" (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-1	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-2	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-3	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-4	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-5	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-6	Stamp removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-7	Tape removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-8	Label removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-9	Label removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-10	Tape removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 89-10-1	Tape removed from Item 89 (1B209-E6207204)
Item 90	One PVC pipe with end cap, putty, wire, and plastic film (1B210, E6207206)
Item 90-1	Tape removed from Item 90 (1B210, E6207206)
Item 90-2	Tape removed from Item 90 (1B210, E6207206)
Item 90-3	Piece of paper removed from Item 90 (1B210, E6207206)
Item 90-4	Velcro removed from Item 90 (1B210, E6207206)
Item 90-5	Timer with wire, end cap, putty, and spring (1B210, E6207206)
Item 91	PVC pipe with end caps, wire, putty, and digital timer (1B257-E5523923)

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Item 91-1	Debris from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-2	Tape removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-3	Tape removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-4	Tape removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-5	Paper removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-6	Paper removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-7	Velcro removed from Item 91 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-8	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-9	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-10	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-11	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-12	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-13	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-14	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-15	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 91-16	Glass recovered from Item 91-1 (1B257-E5523923)
Item 92	Envelope formerly addressed to "Tom Steyers" (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-1	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-2	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-3	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-4	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-5	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-6	Stamp removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-7	Tape removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-8	Label removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-9	Label removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 92-10	Tape removed from Item 92 (1B258-E5523924)
Item 93	Envelope (1B259-E5523925)
Item 93-1	Powder removed from Item 93 (1B259-E5523925)
Item 93-1-1	Powder sample from Item 93-1 (1B259-E5523925)

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Item 93-1-2	Debris from Item 93-1 (1B259-E5523925)
Item 93-2	Glass recovered from Item 93 (1B259-E5523925)
Item 93-3	Label removed from Item 93 (1B259-E5523925)
Item 94	Powder sample from Item 91 (1B260-E5523926)
Item 95	Powder sample (1B206-E6207201)
Item 96	Powder sample (1B207-E6207202)
Item 97	Powder sample (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-1	Debris from Item 97 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-2	Glass recovered from Item 97-1 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-3	Glass recovered from Item 97-1 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-4	Glass recovered from Item 97-1 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-5	Glass recovered from Item 97-1 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 97-6	Glass recovered from Item 97-1 (1B208-E6207203)
Item 98	Envelope (1B205-E6207200)
Item 98-1	Powder removed from Item 98 (1B205-E6207200)
Item 98-1-1	Debris from Item 98-1 (1B205-E6207200)
Item 98-2	Label removed from Item 98 (1B205-E6207200)
Item 99	DNA Secondary evidence (110 tubes)

This report contains the final results of the hazardous device examinations performed in the Explosives Unit.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The Explosives Unit (EU) received 18 Submissions related to the captioned case. Submissions 1 through 13, Submissions 15, and submissions 17 through 18 contained remains of sixteen (16) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's). Submissions 14 and 16 were not IEDs.

All of these devices had some form of a Render Safe Procedure (RSP) performed on them. A RSP uses tools to remotely break apart a suspected live device; thereby, making it safe to approach and collect the evidence.

This report will be broken down into two Sections, Section 1 will cover the conclusions for all submitted items and Section 2 will cover results of examination for each submission separated by submission numbers. The submission numbers and device numbers are in different order due to labeling by different divisions in the FBI. A supplemental report will be issued at a later date covering the similarities between the submissions.

Listed below is each Submission number with its assigned Device number.

- Submission 1 (Device 5), consisted of Items 1 through Item 4-4-1, and Item 9, addressed to Maxim Waters, 2221 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.
- Submission 2 (Device 4), consisted of Items 5 through Item 8-2, addressed to Barrack Obama, P.O. Box 91000, Washington, D.C. 20066.
- Submission 3 (Device 1), consisted of Items 10 through Item 28, addressed to George Soros, 136 Cantitoe Street, Katonah, New York 10536-3804.
- Submission 4 (Device 8), consisted of Items 29 through Item 32-1-1, addressed to Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., Rockland Plaza, 1519 Rockland Rd., Wilmington, Delaware 19803.
- Submission 5 (Device 9) consisted of Items 33 through Item 36-2, addressed to Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., 1209 Barley Mill Rd, Wilmington, Delaware 19807.
- Submission 6 (Device 3), consisted of Items 37 through Item 38-11 and Items 86 to Item 88-1, addressed to John Brenan, Time warner (CNN), 10 Columbus Circle, New York, NY, 10019.
- Submission 7 (Device 10), consisted of Items 39 through Item 42-2, addressed to Robert De Niro, Tribeca Productions, 375 Greenwich Street, New York, N.Y. 10013.
- Submission 8, (Device 2), consisted of Items 43 through Items 46-2, addressed to Hilary Clinton 15 Old House Lane, Chappaqua, New York 10514.
- Submission 9 (Device 7), consisted of Items 47 through Items 54, addressed to Eric Himpton Holder, Covington and Bu...., One City Center, 850 Tenth N.W., Washington, D.C. 200...
- Submission 10 (Device 11), consisted of Items 55 through Items 58-4, addressed to Cory Booker, 2 Riverside, Camden, New Jersey 08103.
- Submission 11 (Device 6), consisted of Items 59 through Item 64-2, addressed to Maxim Waters, 10124 South Broadway #1, Los Angeles, California 90003.
- Submission 12 (Device 12), consisted of Items 65 through Item 68-1-2, addressed to James Robert Clapper, Time Warner (CNN), 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y., 10019.
- Submission 13 (Device 13), consisted of Items 69 through Item 72-1, and Items 84 through Item 85, addressed to Kamalia Harris, Suite 7-600, Sacramento, California 95814.
- Submission 14, consisted of Items 73 through Item 77, recovered in the subject's vehicle by the FBI Miami Division.
- Submission 15 (Device 14), consisted of Items 78 through Item 81-2, addressed to Tom Steyers, 1 Maritime Pl, 2 Suite 1325, San Francisco, California, 94111.
- Submission 16, Items 82 through Item 83 and Item 99 were single unit submissions for DNA only. No explosive or device examinations occurred on these submissions.
- Submission 17 (Device 15), consisted of Items 89 through Item 90-5, and Items 95 through Item 98-2, addressed to CNN, One CNN Center, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

- Submission 18 (Device 16), consisted of Items 91 through Item 94, addressed to Tom Steyers, 3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 2330, San Francisco, California 94111.

SECTION 1

CONCLUSION:

Present within the submitted Items are the disassembled remains of 16 (sixteen) Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), also known as homemade bombs or destructive devices. The general components of an IED are a main explosive charge, a fuzing system and a container.

The submitted Items each consisted of a low explosive main charge, a confinement container, a concealment container and an electric fuzing system. When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gasses. Within a confinement container the gases rapidly expand causing an explosion of the container. This explosion would result in fragments of the container being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment. Additionally, all sixteen (16) of these devices had glass fragments added. Hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to impart further physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

Properly assembled and initiated the resulting explosion from an IED of this type could cause property damage and or personal injury.

As submitted, the devices would not have functioned as a result of their design. The fuzing system for each device lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for these devices. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Submission 14, consisted of commercially produced fireworks. Fireworks are also referred to as low explosive pyrotechnic devices. The powder in these devices can be removed and utilized as a main charge in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

A detailed description of the individual components are set forth hereafter.

SECTION 2

RESULTS OF EXAMINATIONS:

Items 1 through 99, are covered by each submission detailed below.

SUBMISSION 1 (Device 5)

Submission 1, (Device 5), consisted of Items 1 through 4-4-1, addressed to Maxim Waters, 2221 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. This device was transported to the

FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 3) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 2) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 3-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 3-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 3-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 3-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)


When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):

Concealment Container:



(Figure 1, Front of Item 1)




(Figure 2, Back of Item 1)


Present in Item 1 (Figure 1 and 2) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 in x 7 in and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 3, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 4, Item 2 Pipe)


Present in Item 2 (Figures 3 and 4) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.92 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.04 inches and an approximate length of 5.875 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "00 PSI @ 23 C NSF R PW-G U.P. Code ASTM".

The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.05 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had the similar manufacturer information on them of "CHARLOTTE, USA, ... 007, ... SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "12" on end cap A and "9" on end cap B. Some of the printed text was obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each. The holes are similar in diameter measuring approximately 0.17 inch. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.


The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:


(Figure 5, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 6, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 7, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 8, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 9, Item 2 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 10, Item 2 x-ray of Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 5 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 2 (Figures 5 through 10) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 16 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 2 (Figures 5 through 8) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder which was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to utilize in this manner.

Item 2 (Figures 5 through 10) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 2-4 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.449 inch in diameter and approximately 0.143 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 0.965 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0 % Hg CELL"; and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:**Fragmentation:**

Present in Items 3-5-1 to 3-5-10 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 1) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 2) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 1-1 through Item 1-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 1.

Item 1-7, is a clear piece of tape that secured the Items 1-7-1 and 1-7-2 to the front of Item 1. Both items are pieces of paper with the following information typed on them; Item 1-7-1, "TO: MAXIM WATERS, 2221 RAYBURN HOUSE, OFFICE BUILDING"; and Item 1-7-2 "WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515".

Item 1-8 is a piece of paper with "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325" typed on it.

Item 1-9 is paper removed from back of the envelope labeled "NOVITEX GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, CAPITOL HEIGHTS MAIL FACILITY, 5-6000", "HOUSE", "FROM DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, CARR United States Postal Service, TRK# HOR9010050271, Date 10/24/2018, TIME 0743", "TO: WATERS, MAXINE, OFFICE: REPRESENTATIVE MAXINE WATERS, BUILDING: RAYBURN, MS: 2221, ROUTE: HR-RAYBURN-5", bar code of "99990100502272". This paper is placed on the back of the envelope at the Capitol Heights mail facility for proper routing of mail.

Item 2-2, are two (2) pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 2-3, is one (1) piece of paper with a picture of a visual approximation of an ISIS flag on it.

Item 2-3-1, is one (1) picture of a face, which appears to represent Representative Maxine Waters.

Item 2-4 is hook and loop tape from Item 2.

Item 4 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 4-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 4-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 1; Items 2-1, 1-10, 1-11, 1-11-1, 1-11-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 4-1-1, 4-1-1, 4-1-2, 4-1-3, 4-2, 4-2-1, 4-3, 4-4, and 4-4-1. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 2 (Device 4)

Submission 2, labeled as Device 4, consisted of Items 5 through Item 9, addressed to Barrack Obama, P.O. BOX 91000 Washington, D.C. 20066. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 7) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 6) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 7-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 7-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 7-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on item 7-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**

(Figure 11, Front of Item 5)




(Figure 12, Back of Item 5)


Present in Item 5 (Figures 11 and 12) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 13, Item 6 Pipe and fuze system)




(Figure 14, Item 6 Pipe and fuze system)


Present in Item 6 (Figures 13 and 14) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately .081 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.06 inches and an approximate length of 5.625 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "...CH 40 PR 480 PSI @ 23 C NSF R PW-G U.P. Code ASTM 01785 upc...".

The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.04 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.03 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The manufacturer information is as follows, "CHARLOTTE, USA, ... 007, ... SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "8" on end cap A and "1" on end cap B. The holes in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuze system into the main charge container.


The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily containing the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:


(Figure 15, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 16, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 17, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 18, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 19, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 20, Item 6 Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An

electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 4 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 6 (Figures 15 through 18 and 20) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 16 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 6 (Figures 15 through 20) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder which was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 6 (Figure 15) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 6-4 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.453 inch in diameter and approximately 0.127 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.437 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL", and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act as a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 7-5-1 through 7-5-10 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 5) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 6) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 5-1 through Item 5-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 5.

Item 5-7, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 5-8, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: BARRACK OBAMA, P.O. BOX 91000, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066.

Item 6-2, are two (2) pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 6-3, is one (1) piece of paper with a picture of a visual approximation of an ISIS flag on it.

Item 6-3-1, is one (1) picture of faces which appears to be representative of Barrack Obama's family.

Item 8 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 8-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 2; Items 5-9, 6-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 8-1-2, 8-1-3, 8-2, and 9. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

SUBMISSION 3 (Device 1)


Submission 3, labeled as Device 1, consisted of Items 10 through Item 28, addressed to George Soros, 132 Cantitoe Street, Katonah, New York, 10536-3804. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the New York Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.

MAIN CHARGE:


A chemical analysis of a powder sample, Item 17, identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 17 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 17. Items 10, 11, 12, 14 and 28 were not analyzed due to the presence of bulk material in Item 17. Limited analysis was conducted on Item 16-1 due to the small sample size and the presence of bulk material in Item 17.

For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on these items, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 21, Front of Item 13)




(Figure 22, Back of Item 13)

Present in Item 13 (Figures 21 and 22) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.


The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:


(Figure 23, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 24, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 25, Item 26 remains of plastic pipe)




(Figure 26, Item 15 remains of Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Items 15, 16, and 26 (Figures 23 through 26) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The pipe nipple had been separated by an RSP. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.91 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.08 inches. The length of the remaining part of the pipe nipple is approximately 2.42 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "TrueFit System 20...". Part of the pipe nipple Item 26, shown in (Figures 20 through 23), was fragmented due to the RSP.


The end caps had similar measurements of approximately 1.13 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.03 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it; "CHARLOTTE, U.S.A. ... ¾ SCH 40 D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "2" on end cap A and "12" on end cap B. The holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 27, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 28, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 29, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 30, Item 15 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 31, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 32, Item 16 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 33, Item 24 Fragmented remains of the fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 1 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 16 (Figures 27 through 32) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 16 (Figures 27 through 32) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was separated due to the RSP. The coiled wire was attached to the black insulated wire on one end and the red insulated wire on the other end. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Items 13-12, 15, 17-3, 18-3, 24, and 24-1 (Figures 30 and 33) are the fragmented remains of one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple. The remains of the clock had one hole made into its side. The clock had one (1) red wire inserted into the side of the clock. The

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internal components of the clock were fragmented due to the RSP. The fragments pieces were similar with the clock pieces from the other submission in this report. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

Item 21, one (1) "AGIO" battery that had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.132 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.03 volts. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. This battery was similar to the other battery submissions from the clock in this report. A battery properly connected could act as a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 17-1 through Item 17-1-12, and Items 20 through Item 20-5 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope, the pipe nipple with end caps, or miscellaneous fragments removed under this submission during examinations.

Items 13-2 through Item 13-7 are six (6) damage U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 13.

Item 13-9, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: GEORGE SOROS 136 CANTITOE STREET KATONAH, NEW YORK 10536-3804".

Item 13-10, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Items 13-12-1, 15-1, 16-2, 16-4, 18-6 and 26-1 are pieces of black tape of varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

A powder sample, Item 13-1, was removed from the envelope and was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

Item 13-13, labeled as "A" in the laboratory, is a small piece of Item 13, one (1) manila envelope.

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Item 16-2-1 and Item 23, are pieces of what appears to be one (1) picture that has several individuals on it, one of the images appears to be representative of George Soros.

Items 16-3, and 18-7 are one (1) torn piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 27, pieces of hook and loop tape.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 3; Items 13-8, 13-11, 16-1-1, 16-2-1-1, 16-3-1, 17-2, 17-3, 18, 18-7-1, 18-1, 18-4, 18-5, 18-8, 19, 22, 22-1 and Item 25. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 4 (Device 8)

Submission 4, labeled as Device 8, consisted of Items 29 through Items 32-1-1, addressed to Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., Rockland Plaza, 1519 Rockland Rd., Wilmington, Delaware 19803. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 31) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 30) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 31-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 31-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 31-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on item 31-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 34, Front of Item 29)




(Figure 35, Back of Item 29)

Present in Item 29 (Figures 34 and 35) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 36, Item 30 plastic pipe)



(Figure 37, Item 6 plastic pipe with clock)

Present in Item 30 (Figures 36 and 37) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately .092 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.05 inches and an approximate length of 5.95 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "FL TrueFit R System 20007 3/4" PVC 1120 SDR 21 PR2".

The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.04 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.30 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.06 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it: "CHARLOTTE, USA, 447 007 ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "2" on both end caps (A and B). The holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.


The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:




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
(Figure 38, Item 30 X-Ray of pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 39, Item 30 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 40, Item 30 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 41, Item 30 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 42, Item 30 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 43, Item 30 Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 8 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 30 (Figures 38 through 43) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 30 (Figures 38 through 41 and 43) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 30 (Figures 38 through 41) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 30-6 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.450 inch in diameter and approximately 0.126 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL"; and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act as a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 31-2 through 31-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 29) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 30) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 29-3 through Item 29-8 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 29.

Item 29-1, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN JR., ROCKLAND PLAZA, 1519 ROCKLAND RD., WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19803".

Item 29-2, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 30-2, is one (1) picture of faces which appears to be representative of Joseph Biden and his Wife, Jill Biden.

Item 30-3, is one (1) piece of paper with a picture of a visual approximation of an ISIS flag on it.

Item 30-4, is one (1) picture of faces which appears to be representative of Beau Biden and his family.

Item 30-5, are two (2) pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 32 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 32-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 32-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-

03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 4; Items 29-9, 30-1, and 30-1-1. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

SUBMISSION 5 (Device 9)

Submission 5, labeled as Device 9, consisted of Items 33 through Items 36-2, addressed to Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., Rockland Plaza, 1519 Rockland Rd., Wilmington, Delaware 19807. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 35) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 34) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 35-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 35-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 35-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 35-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)


When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):

Concealment Container:



(Figure 44, Front of Item 33)




(Figure 45, Back of Item 33)


Present in Item 33 (Figures 44 and 45) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 46, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 47, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Item 34 (Figures 46 and 47) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately .092 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.03 inches and an approximate length of 4.875 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows “www.charlottepipe.com” and “CHARLOTTE”.


The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.06 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.30 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.06 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it of “CHARLOTTE, USA, 447 007 ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw”, “14” on end cap A and “2” on end cap B. The holes made in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 48, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 49, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 50, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 51, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 52, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 53, Item 34 Pipe and fuzing system)



2018-03241 Item 34

(Figure 54, Item 34 X-Ray of pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 9 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 34 (Figures 48 through 54) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 34 (Figures 48 through 54) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 34 (Figures 48 through 51 and 54) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 34-6 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides

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of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.452 inch in diameter and approximately 0.122 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.5 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL"; and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act as a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 35-2 through 35-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 33) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 34) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 33-1 through Item 33-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 33.

Item 33-7, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN JR., 1209 BARLEY MILL RD., WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19807".

Item 33-8, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 34-2, is one (1) picture of faces which appears to be representative of Beau Biden and his family.

Item 34-3, is one (1) piece of paper with a picture of a visual approximation of an ISIS flag on it.

Item 34-4, is one (1) picture of faces which appears to be representative of Joseph Biden, Jill Biden and his daughter.

Item 34-5, are two (2) pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 36 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample 36-1 was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 36-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3,

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dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 5; Items 33-9, 33-9-1, 33-10, 34-1, 34-7, 34-7-1, 34-7-2, and 36-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 6 (Device 3)

Submission 6, labeled as Device 3, consisted of Items 37 through Item 38-11 and Items 86 through Item 90-5, addressed to John Brenan, Time warner (CNN), 10 Columbus Circle, New York, NY, 10019. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 38) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 37) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 38-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 38-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 38-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 38-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 55, Front of Item 86)




(Figure 56, Back of Item 86)

Present in Item 86 (Figures 55 and 56) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 57, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 58, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Item 37 (Figures 57 and 58) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately .090 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.05 inches and an approximate length of 5.33 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "1 PR200 PSI @ 23 c NSFrPW-G U.P.C.".


The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.03 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.31 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it, "CHARLOTTE, USA, 447 007 ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "10" on end cap A and "8" on end cap B. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 59, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 60, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 61, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 62, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 63, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 64, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 65, Item 37 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 66, Item 37 X-Ray of pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 3 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 37 (Figures 59 through 66) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 37 (Figures 59 through 66) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires,

UNCLASSIFIED

referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 37 (Figures 59 through 63 and 66) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 37-3 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.452 inch in diameter and approximately 0.121 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL", and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 38-2 through 38-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 86) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 37) during examinations in the laboratory.

Item 37-1, is various pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 37-2-1, is one (1) picture of a face, which appears to be representative of John O. Brennan.

Item 37-2-2, is one (1) piece of paper with a picture of a visual approximation of an ISIS flag on it, but it actually has "GET ER DONE" on it.

Items 86-1-7 through Item 86-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 86.

Item 86-7, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: JOHN BRENNAN, TIME WARNER (CNN), 10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE, NEW YORK, NY 100019".

UNCLASSIFIED

Item 86-8, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 87 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample Item 88 was removed from the envelope was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 6; Items 37-2, 86-9, 87-1, and 88-1 are varying pieces of evidence. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 7 (Device 10)

Submission 7, labeled as Device 10, consisted of Items 39 through Items 42-2, addressed to Robert De Niro, Tribeca Productions, 375 Greenwich Street, New York, N.Y. 10013. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 41) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 40) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 41-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 41-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 41-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 41-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 67, Front of Item 39)




(Figure 68, Back of Item 39)

Present in Item 39 (Figures 67 and 68) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 69, Item 40 Pipe with fuzing system)




(Figure 70, Item 40 Pipe with fuzing system)

Present in Item 40 (Figures 69 and 70) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately .0.93 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.06 inches and an approximate length of 4.625 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "PVC 1120 SDR 21 PR200 PSI @ 23...".


The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.03 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.31 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.17 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it, "CHARLOTTE, USA, 447 007 ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "15" on end cap A and "7" on end cap B. The holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuze system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 71, Item 40 Pipe and fuze system)




(Figure 72, Item 40 Pipe and fuze system)




(Figure 73, Item 40 Pipe and fuze system)



(Figure 74, Item 40 Pipe and fuze system)



(Figure 75, Item 40 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 76, Item 40 X-Ray of Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, Device 10 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 40 (Figures 71 through 76) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 40 (Figures 71 through 76) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 40 and 40-4 (Figures 71 through 74 and 76), had pieces of one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 40-3 hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

UNCLASSIFIED

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.454 inch in diameter and approximately 0.124 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.5 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL", and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 41-2 through 41-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 39) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 40) during examinations in the laboratory.

Item 39-1, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: ROBERT DE NIRO, TRIBECA PRODUCTIONS, 325 GREENWICH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10013".

Item 39-2, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Items 39-3 through Item 39-8 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 39.

Item 40-1, is two (2) various pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 40-2-1, is one (1) picture of a face, which appears to be representative of Robert De Niro.

Item 40-2-2, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it as follows, "reserves the right to publish his identity, CNN, should any of that change".

Item 42 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 42-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 42-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 7; Items 39-9, 40-2, and 42-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous

device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory report.

SUBMISSION 8 (Device 2)

Submission 8, labeled as Device 2, consisted of Items 43 through Item 46-2, addressed to Hilary Clinton 15 Old House Lane, Chappaqua, New York 10514. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 45) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 44) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 45-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 45-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 45-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 45-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)


When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):

Concealment Container:



(Figure 77, Front of Item 43)




(Figure 78, Back of Item 43)


Present in Item 43 (Figures 77 and 78) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 79, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 80, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Item 44 (Figures 79 and 80) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.93 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.06 inches and an approximate length of 5.75 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "CP-110-P MADE IN U.S.A. 04/17/17 21:32".


The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.05 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.30 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.18 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it, "CHARLOTTE, USA..., .07 3/4 SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "11" on end cap A and "13" on end cap B. The holes in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 81, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 82, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 83, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 84, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 85, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 86, Item 44 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 87, Item 44 X-Ray Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 2 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 44 (Figures 81 through 87) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 44 (Figures 81 through 85 and 87) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 44 (Figures 81 through 84 and 87) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

UNCLASSIFIED

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.452 inch in diameter and approximately 0.120 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL", and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 45-1 through 45-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 43) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 44) during examinations in the laboratory.

Item 43-10, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: HILARY CLINTON, 15 OLD HOUSE LANE, CHAPPAQUA, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10013".

Item 43-7 and 43-8, are two pieces of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Items 43-1 through Item 43-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 43.

Item 44-2, is one (1) picture of four faces that appear to be representative of the Clinton family.

Item 44-3, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 44-4, is three (3) various pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 46 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 46-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 46-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 8; Items 43-9, 43-11, 44-1, and 46-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and

hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

SUBMISSION 9 (Device 7)

Submission 9, labeled as Device 7, consisted of Items 47 through Items 54, addressed to Eric Himpton Holder, Covington and Bu..., One City Center, 850 Tenth N.W., Washington, D.C. 200... This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Miami Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.

MAIN CHARGE:


A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 52) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 52 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 52. Items 53 and 54, were not analyzed due to the presence of bulk material in Item 52.

For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 52, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)


When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):

Concealment Container:



(Figure 88, Remains of Item 48)




(Figure 89, Remains of Item 48 Front/Back)

Present in Item 48 (Figures 88 and 89) is the remains of two (2) manila envelopes. The envelope has been damaged due to the RSP performed. One (1) of the envelopes is the remains of a routing envelope used by the U.S. House of Representative and not part of the device. The


second envelope is part of the Device described below. The second envelope has bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with a partial bar code of 39560.

The DuckBrand envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 90, Item 47 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 91, Item 47 remains of Pipe and fuzing system)


Present in Item 47 (Figures 90 and 91) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the remaining pipe nipple (Figure 83) measures approximately 0.85 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.06 inches and an approximate length of 3.50 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "EXT.IL....MN...ww". The fragmented part of the pipe is shown in Figure 84, no manufacture information could be obtained due to the condition of the pieces from the RSP.

The end cap (Figure 90) measures approximately 1.03 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.31 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end cap had the following information on it "CHARLOTTE, USA 447, 00. ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", and "12" on end cap A. The end cap had one small hole in it with a diameter measuring approximately 0.19 inch. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container. The second end cap, labeled B (Figure 91) is fragmented and no manufactured information could be obtained due to the RSP.


The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:


(Figure 92, Item 47 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 93, Item 47 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 94, Item 47 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 95, Item 50 fragmented clock pieces from the fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

The required components for an electrical fuzing system were present in the submitted items. It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 7 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 47 (Figures 92 through 94) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 47 (Figures 92 through 94) had pieces of solder, some pieces that were still attached on both ends to the wires described above. The solder was logically on the inside of the pipe due to similarities of construction with the other submitted items. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 50 (Figure 95) are the fragmented remains of one (1) black colored clock that had a hook and loop tape piece with it. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was also submitted. The clock had no manufacturer markings. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.44 inch in diameter and approximately 0.116 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had rust on it masking other manufacturer's information. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:**Fragmentation:**

Present in Items 52-2 through 52-8 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 47) and/or the envelope (Item 48) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 47-1 and 49-1, are multiple pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 47-3, is one (1) picture of a face that appear to be representative of Eric Holder.

Items 47-4 and 49-4, are pieces of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Items 48-1 through Item 48-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 48.

Item 48-7, is two pieces of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDA, 33325".

Item 48-8, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: ERIC HIMPTON H.LDER, COVINGTON AND BU..., ONE CITY CENTER 850 TENTH N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., 200..".

Items 49-3, 50-1 and 50-5, are pieces of hook and loop tape.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 9; Items 47-2, 48-9, 48-10, 48-10-1, 48-10-2, 48-11, 48-12, 49-2, 50-2, 51, and 52-1. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 10 (Device 11)

Submission 10, labeled as Device 11, consisted of Items 55 through Items 58-4, addressed to Cory Booker, 2 Riverside, Camden, New Jersey 08103. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Miami Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.


MAIN CHARGE:

A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 55) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 55 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 55. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 55, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 96, Front of Item 57)




(Figure 97, Back of Item 57)

Present in Item 57 (Figures 96 and 97) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 98, Item 58 remains of plastic pipe tem)



(Figure 99, Item 58 remains of plastic pipe)


Present in Item 58 (Figures 98 and 99) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.93 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.00 inches and an approximate length of 3.78 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "... 17/17 21:32 EXT #4L MN....".

The fragmented part of the pipe is shown in Figure 98, no manufacture information could be obtained due to the condition of the pieces from the RSP.


The end cap in Figure 99 measures approximately 1.00 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.25 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.05 inches. The end cap had the following information on it "CHARLOTTE, U.. 447, ... ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", and "5" on it. The intact end cap had one small hole in it with a diameter measuring approximately 0.18 inch. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuze system into the main charge container. The second end cap in Figure 98 is fragmented and no manufactured information could be obtained due to the RSP.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 100, Item 58 Pipe and fuze system)



(Figure 101, Item 58 Pipe and fuze system)



(Figure 102, Item 58 Pipe and fuze system)



(Figure 103, Item 58 Pipe and fuze system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

The required components for an electrical fuzing system were present in the submitted items. It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 11 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 58 (Figures 100 through 103) is one (1) black insulated wire. The black insulated wire is a multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED. It should be noted that no red insulated wire was submitted which would be consistent with the other devices.

Item 58 (Figures 100 through 103) had pieces of solder, some pieces were still attached to the wire described above. The solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 58 (Figures 100 through 103) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. The clock had one (1) black wire inserted the side of the clock and was not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.118 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had rust on it masking the manufacturer's information. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 55-2 through 55-11 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 57) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 58) during examinations in the laboratory.

Item 57-1, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: CORY BOOKER, 2 RIVERSIDE, CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY, 08103".

Item 57-2, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Items 57-3 through Item 57-8 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 57.

Items 58-2, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 58-2-1, is one (1) picture of three faces, with one of the faces that appear to be representative of Cory Booker.

Item 58-3, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 56 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 56-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 56-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 10; Items 55-1, 56-1-2, 57-9, 58-1 and 58-4. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 11 (Device 6)

Submission 11, labeled as Device 6, consisted of Items 59 through Item 64-2, addressed to Maxim Waters, 10124 South Broadway #1, Los Angeles, California 90003. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Los Angeles Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.


MAIN CHARGE:

A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 61) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 61 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 61. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 61, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**

(Figure 104, Front of Item 63)




(Figure 105, Back of Item 63)


Present in Item 63 (Figures 104 and 105) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 106, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 107, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)


Present in Item 62 (Figures 106 and 107) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.93 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.00 inches and an approximate length of 5.08 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows “20 SDR 21 PR200 PSI @ 23...”. The fragmented part of the pipe did not have any manufacture information due to the condition of the remains from the RSP.

The intact end cap, (Figures 106 and 107), measures approximately 1.00 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.03 inches. The end cap had the following information on it “CHARLOTTE, ..., 44. .07, ¾ SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw”, and “9” on the end cap. The intact end cap had one small hole in it with a diameter measuring approximately 0.18 inch. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container. The second end cap, (Figures 106 and 107) is fragmented and no manufactured information could be obtained due to the RSP.


The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:


(Figure 108, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 109, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 110, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 111, Item 62 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 112, Item 62 X-Ray of Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An

electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

The required components for an electrical fuzing system were present in the submitted items. It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 6 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 62 (Figures 108-112) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 62 (Figures 108-112) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder which was attached to the red insulated wire. The other end of the solder had been separated from the black wire due to the RSP performed on this IED. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 62 (Figures 108-112) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 62-3, hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. The clock had one (1) black wire inserted into the side of the clock and the wire was not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.122 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had rust on it masking the manufacturer's information. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 62-6-1 through Item 62-6-4 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 62) and/or the envelope (Item 63) during examinations in the laboratory.

Item 62-2, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 62-4, is one (1) picture of a face that appears to be representative of Maxim Waters.

Items 62-5, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Items 63-1 through Item 63-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 63.

Item 63-7, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: MAXIM WATERS, 10124 SOUTH BROADWAY #1, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, 90003".

Item 63-8, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 64 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 60 was removed from the envelope was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 11; Items 59, 62-1, 62-6, 63-9, 64-1, 64-1-1, and Item 64-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 12 (Device 12)

Submission 12, labeled as Device 12, consisted of Items 65 through Item 68-1-2, addressed to James Robert Clapper, Time Warner (CNN), 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y., 10019. This device was transported to the FBI Explosives Unit and Rendered Safe at Charlie Demolition Range, Quantico, VA by FBI Bomb Technicians.


MAIN CHARGE:

Powder (Item 67) was removed from the pipe nipple (Item 66) and chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 67-1) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 67-1 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 67-1. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 67-1, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**

(Figure 113, Front of Item 65)




(Figure 114, Back of Item 65)


Present in Item 65 (Figures 113 and 114) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 115, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)




(Figure 116, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)

Present in Item 66 (Figures 115 and 116) is one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.82 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.00 inches and an approximate length of 5.25 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "CHARLOTTE PIPE R PLNC TRUEFIT SYSTEM 0400".


The end caps are similar in dimensions measuring approximately 1.03 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.31 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.18 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on it, "CHARLOTTE, USA 447, 007 3/4 SCH 40, D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", "5" on end cap A and "2" on end cap B. The holes in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuze system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 117, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)




(Figure 118, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)




(Figure 119, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)




(Figure 120, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)



(Figure 121, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)



(Figure 122, Item 66 Pipe with fuze system)



(Figure 123, Item 66 X-Ray of Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

As submitted, the Device 12 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 66 (Figures 117 through 123) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 66 (Figures 117 through 123) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached on both ends to the wires described above. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 66 (Figures through 117 and 120 and 123) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker (Item 66-6), with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the

front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.452 inch in diameter and approximately 0.121 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery had the following markings on it, "AGIO + 0.0% Hg CELL"; and is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 67-2 through 67-11 are small fragments of broken glass. These glass pieces were inside the confinement container. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 65) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 66) during examinations in the laboratory.

Items 65-1 through Item 65-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 65.

Item 65-7, is a piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: JAMES ROBERT CLAPPER, TIME WARNER (CNN), 10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019".

Item 65-8, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 66-1, is two (2) various pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 66-2-1, is one (1) picture of a face that appears to be representative of James Clapper.

Item 66-2-2, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to be a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 66-3, is one (1) piece of padded envelope.

Items 66-4 and 66-5 are hook and loop tape from Item 66.

Item 68 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 68-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 68-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 12; Items 65-7-1, 65-9, 66-2, and 68-1-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 13 (Device 13)

Submission 13, labeled as Device 13, consisted of Items 69 through Item 72-1, and Items 84 through Item 85, addressed to Kamalia Harris, Suite 7-600, Sacramento, California 95814. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Sacramento Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.


MAIN CHARGE:

A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 85) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 85 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 85. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 85, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 124, Remains of Item 69)




(Figure 125, Remains of Item 69 Front/Back)

Present in Item 69 (Figures 124 and 125) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 126, Item 70 remains of plastic pipe)




(Figure 127, Item 70 remains of plastic pipe)

Present in Item 70 (Figures 126 and 127) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.91 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.07 inches and an approximate length of 4.824 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "U.P. Code ASTM D 2241". One end cap was separated from the main pipe due to the RSP.


The end caps measures approximately 1.13 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.03 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.18 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on them, "CHARLOTTE, U.S.A. ¾...CH 40 D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", and "11" on end cap A and "14" on end cap B. The holes in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 128, Item 70 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 129, Item 70 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 130, Item 70 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 131, Item 70 Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An

electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

The required components for an electrical fuzing system were present in the submitted items. It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 13 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 70 (Figures 128 through 131) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 70 (Figures 128 through 131) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached to the red insulated wire. The other end of the solder had been separated from the black wire due to the RSP performed on this IED. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 70 (Figures 128 through 131) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 70 -3, hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. The clock had one (1) red wire inserted into the side of the clock and the wire was not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.120 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.3 volts. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 70-6, 71-1 through Item 71-10 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 69) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 70) during examinations in the laboratory, or in the field by evidence teams.

Item 69-1, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDA, 33325".

Item 69-2, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: KAMALIA HARRIS, SUITE 7-600, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814".

Items 69-3 through Item 69-8 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 69.

Item 70-2, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 70-4, is one (1) picture of two faces, one that appears to be representative of Kamalia Harris.

Items 70-5, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 72 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample from Item 72, labeled as Item 84, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 13; Items 69-9, 70-1, and Item 72-1. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

SUBMISSION 14

Submission 14, Items 73 through 77 were recovered by the FBI Miami Division during a search of the Subject's van.


Items 73, 74 and 76 consisted of commercially produced fireworks and wrappers. Fireworks are also referred to as low explosive pyrotechnic devices.

The powder in commercially produced fireworks can be removed and utilized as a main charge in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Additional items in this submission, Items 75 and 77 consisted of timers and solder.

Pyrotechnic Items and wrappers:

(Figure 132, Item 73 Fire work)



(Figure 133, Item 74 Mr. Crackle firework)

Item 73 (Figure 132) is one (1) "TNT BLAZING REBEL" pyrotechnic manufactured for American Promotional Events Inc., Florence, AL 35630.


Item 74 (Figure 133) is one (1) "TNT MR. CRACKLE" pyrotechnic manufactured for American Promotional Events Inc., Florence, AL 35630.

EXPLOSIVES CHEMISTRY:


A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Items 73-2 and 74-2) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Items 73-2 and 74-2 reacted energetically. Items 73-3 and Item 74-3 contained a low explosive mixture of potassium perchlorate and material consistent with charcoal (fuel). For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on these items, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS:



(Figure 134, Front and back of Item 75)



(Figure 135, Electronic clock Item 77)

Items 75 and 75-1 (Figure 134) consisted of three (3) packages, each containing one (1) roll of solder. The solder brand was "HYPER TOUGH SOLDER" and distributed by Walmart Stores, Inc.

This solder is visibly similar to the solder utilized in the other devices covered in this report.

Item 77 (Figure 135) is one (1) black colored clock that was not consistent with the other clocks in the submissions covered in this report. The clock had no manufacturer information on it except for the letters "XT" that have been printed on the face. The clock measures approximately 3.25 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front.

The following items submitted under Submission 14; Items 73-1, 74-1 and 76 are wrappers to the low explosives in this submission (Items 73, 74 and 76). These items contained manufacturer information.

SUBMISSION 15 (Device 14)

Submission 15, labeled as Device 14, consisted of Items 78 through Item 81-2, addressed to Tom Steyers, 1 Maritime Pl, 2 Suite 1325, San Francisco, California, 94111. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Sacramento Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.

MAIN CHARGE:


A chemical analysis of a powder sample (Item 80) identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 80 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals

consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 80. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 80, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)


When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):

Concealment Container:



(Figure 136, Front of Item 78)




(Figure 137, Back of Item 78)


Present in Item 78 (Figures 136 and 137) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 138, Item 79 remains of plastic pipe)




(Figure 139, Item 79 remains of plastic pipe)

Present in Item 79 (Figures 138 and 139) are the fragmented remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with one (1) end cap and one (1) fragmented end cap. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.90 inch with an approximate outer diameter. The length of the remaining part of the pipe nipple is approximately 3.50 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows “...SF @ pw-G...U.P....”. Part of the pipe nipple and end cap, was fragmented due to the RSP.


The end cap in (Figures 138 and 139) measures approximately 1.13 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.03 inches. The end cap had the following information on it “CHARLOTTE, U.S.A. ... ¾ SCH 40 D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw”, and “2” on the end cap. The end cap had one small hole in it with a diameter measuring approximately 0.18 inch. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container. Due to the fragmented nature of the other end cap, no information or measurements could be obtained.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 140, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 141, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 142, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 143, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 144, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 145, Item 79 Pipe and fuzing system)



2018-03241 Item 79

(Figure 146, Item 79 x-ray of pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 14 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 79 (Figures 140 through 146) is one (1) black insulated wire. The black insulated wire is a multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED. It should be noted that no red insulated wire was submitted which would be consistent with the other devices.

Item 79 (Figures 140 through 146) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached to the black insulated wire. The other end of the solder had been separated from the other wire, logically a red wire, due to the RSP performed on this IED. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 79 (Figures 140 through 146) had one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by Item 79-5, hook and loop tape. The clock had two holes made into its side. The clock had one (1) black wire inserted into the side of the clock and the wire was not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.119 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.3 volts. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:**Fragmentation:**

Present in Items 79-10 through Item 79-19 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 78) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 79) during examinations in the laboratory or in the field by evidence teams.

Items 78-1 through Item 78-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 78.

UNCLASSIFIED

Item 78-7, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: TOM STEYERS, 1 MARITIME PL 2 SUITE 1325, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111".

Item 78-8, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 79-1, 79-2, and 79-3, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Items 79-6, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 79-7, is one (1) picture of two faces, one that appears to be representative of Tom Steyers.

Item 81 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 81-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 81-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 15; Items 78-9, 78-9-1, 79-4, 79-8, 79-9, 81-1-2, and Item 81-2 are varying pieces of evidence. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

SUBMISSION 16 (No Device)

Submission 16, (No Device) consisted of Items 82 through Item 83, and Item 99. These items were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 17 (Device 15)

Submission 17, labeled as Device 15, consisted of Items 89 to Item 90-5, and Items 95 to Item 98-2, addressed to CNN, One CNN Center, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the Atlanta Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.


MAIN CHARGE:

A chemical analysis of a powder sample Item 96 and Item 97, identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 96 and Item 97, reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 96 and Item 97. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 96 and Item 97, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**


(Figure 147, Front of Item 89)




(Figure 148, Back of Item 89)

Present in Item 89 (Figures 147 and 148) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:

(Figure 149, Item 89 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 150, Item 89 Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Item 89 (Figures 149 and 150) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.79 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.07 inches and an approximate length of 4.58 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "...IPE.com CHARLOTTE PIPER PLNC True Fit Sys". The pipe was separated from the main pipe due to the RSP.


The end caps measure approximately 1.13 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.18 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on them, "CHARLOTTE, U.S.A. 447 ... 3/4 SCH 40 D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", and "3" on end cap A and "8" on end cap B. These holes are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.


FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 151, Item 90 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 152, Item 90 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 153, Item 90 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 154, Item 90 Pipe and fuzing system)



2018-03241 Item 90

(Figure 155, Item 90 X-ray of pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 15 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 90 (Figures 151 through 155) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 90 (Figures 151 through 155) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder that was attached to the black insulated wire. The other end of the solder had been separated from the red wire due to the RSP performed on this IED. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 90 (Figures 151 through 155) is one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by hook and loop tape Item 90-4. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.119 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 97-2 through Item 97-6 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the envelope (Item 89) and/or the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 90) during examinations in the laboratory, or in the field by evidence teams.

Items 89-1 through Item 89-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 89.

Item 89-8, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: CNN, ONE CNN CENTER, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303".

Item 89-9, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 90-1, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Items 90-3, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it as follows, "reserves the right to publish his identity", also "CNN" and other markings that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Item 98 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample Item 95 was removed from the envelope, and was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 17; Items 89-7, 89-10, 89-10-1, 90-2, 97-1, 98-1, 98-1-1, and Item 98-2. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.


SUBMISSION 18 (Device 16)

Submission 18, labeled as Device 16, consisted of Items 91 through Item 94, addressed to Tom Steyers, 3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 2330, San Francisco, California 94111. This Device was RSP'ed by local bomb squads in the San Francisco Division. It is common to not recover all of the components of an IED after an RSP because of the violent nature of the procedure on the IED.


MAIN CHARGE:

A chemical analysis of a powder sample Item 94 identified oxidizers and fuels that are commonly utilized in low explosive pyrotechnic formulations. Upon direct exposure to flame, one or more portions of Item 94 reacted energetically. Analysis also identified other chemicals consistent with fertilizer components and commercially available pool shock in Item 94. For detailed information on the chemical analysis conducted on Item 94, see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM)

When properly ignited by a suitable source of heat or energy, low explosives are designed to deflagrate and generate gases. Properly confined in a container such as pipe, the gases from the deflagration generate pressure on the container walls and cause an explosion of the container.

CONTAINER(S):**Concealment Container:**

(Figure 156, Front of Item 92)




(Figure 157, Back of Item 92)


Present in Item 92 (Figures 156 and 157) is one (1) manila envelope, with bubble wrap lining on the inside. Information printed on the back indicates that it is a DuckBrand envelope with an inside dimension of 4 inches x 7 inches and a bar code of 75353 39560, distributed by ShurTech Brands LLC, AVON, OH 44011.

The envelope served not only as the shipping envelope, but also the concealment container. A concealment container hides the components of the IED so unsuspecting victim(s) cannot see the IED.

Confinement Container:



(Figure 158, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 159, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)

Present in Item 91 (Figures 158 and 159) are the remains of one (1) white colored plastic pipe nipple with two (2) end caps. The inner diameter of the pipe nipple measures approximately 0.75 inch with an approximate outer diameter of 1.05 inches and an approximate length of 5.00 inches. Information printed on the pipe nipple is as follows "PSI @ 23C NSF PW-G U.P. Code AS...TM...D". The pipe is shown in Figure 159, was separated from the main pipe due to the RSP.


The end caps measure approximately 1.00 inches in length with an outer diameter of approximately 1.29 inches and an approximate inner diameter of 1.04 inches. The end caps had similar manufacturer information on them, with minor differences due to some information being obliterated due to the end caps having one small hole made in each measuring approximately 0.18 inch in diameter. The end caps had the following information on them, "CHARLOTTE, U.S.A. 447 ... 3/4 SCH 40 D-2466 PVC-1, NSF-pw", and "3" on end cap A and "1" on end cap B. The holes in the end caps are commonly referred to as a priming hole, which allows for insertion of a fuzing system into the main charge container.

The purpose of the main charge container is to hold the low explosive main charge and to temporarily contain the gases produced from the deflagration of the low explosive. An explosion occurs as the container is overcome by the amount of pressure generated from the deflagration of the low explosive. The resulting explosion would have resulted in pipe fragments being propelled outwards at high velocities into the surrounding environment.

FUZING SYSTEM:




(Figure 160, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 161, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 162, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 163, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)




(Figure 164, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 165, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 166, Item 91 Pipe and fuzing system)



(Figure 167, Item 91 x-ray of Pipe and fuzing system)

A Fuzing system in an IED is required to provide the stimulus or energy to cause the main charge explosive to function. This IED had some components of an electrical fuzing system. An electrically activated fuzing system consists of a power source, conductors (wire), switch(es) and a load.

It should be noted that due to the RSP performed on the IED the exact design is difficult to determine; however, the submitted items are consistent with the other IEDs in this report. This leads this device examiner to the conclusion that the fuzing system in this IED is similar to the other IEDs.

As submitted, Device 16 would not have functioned as a result of its design. The fuzing system lacked the proper components and assembly to enable it to function as a method of initiation for this device. It cannot be determined if the non-functional fuzing system is a result of poor design or the intent of the builder.

Conductors, Power source and Switch:

Present in Item 91 (Figures 160 through 167) are two (2) wires; one (1) red insulated wire and one (1) black insulated wire. Both the black and red insulated wires are multi-strand copper colored wire with an approximate measurement of 15 AWG. Wires, properly connected would act as a conductor of energy for an IED.

Item 90 (Figures 160 through 167) had one (1) coiled up piece of solder which was attached to the black insulated wire. The other end of the solder had been separated from the red wire due to the RSP performed on this IED. The coiled up solder was on the inside of the pipe. Thin wires, referred to as bridge wires, are utilized in IED's to restrict electrical current and generate the heat needed to initiate a low explosive. Solder is not an efficient material to be utilized in this manner.

Item 90 (Figures 160 through 167) is one (1) black colored clock that was attached to the pipe nipple by hook and loop tape Item 91-7. The clock had two holes made into its side. One red insulated wire and one black insulated wire were inserted into opposite holes in the clock.

UNCLASSIFIED

The clock measures approximately 3 inches by 1.5 inches and has two buttons on the front. A clear plastic, factory printed sticker, with the numbers "11:35", was attached to the front of the clock. The clock had no manufacturer markings. The wires that were placed into opposite sides of the clock were not attached to the power source (battery) or any wires leading to a power source. A clock properly connected could act as a switch in an IED.

The battery in the clock was an "AGIO" battery and had not been altered. The battery was silver in color measuring approximately 0.45 inch in diameter and approximately 0.123 inch in height. The potential measured voltage was 1.4 volts. The battery is consistent with a LR 41 button type battery. A battery properly connected could act a power source for an IED.

IED ENHANCEMENTS:

Fragmentation:

Present in Items 91-8 through Item 91-16 are small fragments of broken glass. Added hardened objects, such as glass, are referred to as fragmentation. Fragmentation is added to IEDs to enhance physical damage to the surrounding area, and/or injure/kill personnel in the vicinity.

MISCELLANEOUS:

The following items were removed from the pipe nipple with end caps (Item 91) and/or the envelope (Item 92) during examinations in the laboratory, or in the field by evidence teams.

Item 91-2 and Item 91-3, are pieces of black tape varying lengths with a width of .75 inch.

Item 91-5, is one (1) picture of two faces, one that appears to be representative of Tom Steyers.

Items 91-6, is one (1) piece of paper with print on it that appears to a representative attempt at Arabic writing.

Items 92-1 through Item 92-6 are six (6) U.S. Postal stamps removed from Item 92.

Item 92-8, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "TO: TOM STEYERS, 3 EMBARCADERO CENTER, SUITE 2330, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111".

Item 92-9, is one (1) piece of paper with the following information typed on it; "FROM: DEBBIE WASSERMAN SHULTZ, 777 SAW GRASS CORPORATE PARKWAY, SUNRISE, FLORIDS, 33325".

Item 93 is one (1) manila envelope that contained powder and debris. A powder sample, Item 93-1, was removed from the envelope and a sub-sample, Item 93-1-1, was examined and deemed not energetic. For full analysis see the FBI Laboratory Report for Laboratory number 2018-

03241-3, dated November 7, 2018, authorized by Christine M. Marsh. (CMM). Benign powders have been added to IEDs to simulate chemical or biological enhancement.

The following items are varying pieces of evidence and were submitted under Submission 18; Items 91-1, 91-4, 92-7, 93-2, 92-10 and Item 93-3 are varying pieces of evidence. These items, along with all items in this miscellaneous section were deemed not to have any relevance to the conclusions reached by this explosives and hazardous device examiner. However, the items may be part of other examinations and FBI Laboratory reports.

METHODS:

The methods utilized during the analysis of the evidentiary items included the following, as appropriate:

- visual examinations of observable, physical characteristics;
- visual comparison examinations of observable, physical characteristics;
- microscopical examinations of observable, physical characteristics;
- microscopical comparison examinations of observable, physical characteristics;
- measurements of physical characteristics;
- measurement comparison examinations of physical characteristics;
- visual examinations of photographs;
- visual examinations of x-ray images, and
- reviews of references.

GENERAL LIMITATIONS:

- Item source identifications that refer to a specific distributor or manufacturer have not been confirmed with that distributor or manufacturer unless otherwise stated in this report.
- The physical characteristics, such as, but not limited to, material type, shape, and color of all evidentiary items described in the Results of Examination section of this report are based on visual and/or microscopical observations, unless otherwise noted. Other parameters such as, but not limited to, distances, angles, and voltages associated with individual evidentiary items described in the Results of Examination section of this report are based on physical measurements and are approximate, unless otherwise noted. Should a more complete characterization of these items be required, additional examinations can be requested of the appropriate forensic discipline. Diagrams such as, but not limited to, drawings and schematics are not to scale, unless otherwise noted.

SPECIFIC INTERPRETATIONS AND LIMITATIONS:

Due to the absence or alterations of specific manufacturer or other unique markings on items of evidence, conclusive identification of the source of an item may not always be effected in every case. Conclusive determinations of the exact design and functioning of a rendered safe or disassembled improvised explosive device may not be effected in every case due to the condition of the components.

REMARKS:

For questions about the content of this report, please contact Forensic Examiner SSA Kevin D Finnerty at (703)632-7022.

For questions about the status of your submission, including any remaining forensic examinations, please contact Kevin D Finnerty at (703)632-7022.

The evidence will be returned under separate cover.

This report contains the opinions and interpretations of the issuing examiner(s) and is supported by records retained in the FBI files.

The work described in this report was conducted at the Quantico Laboratory.

SSA Kevin D Finnerty
Explosives Unit